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ILLINOIS BRICK AND
ITS LEGISLATIVE AFTERMATH
STEPHEN CALKINS

Member of the District of Columbia Bar
I will attempt to avoid taking a position on Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,1
if only because I am supposed to be an impartial commentator. Whether
some tone comes through in my remarks I will leave for you to decide.
When I was in law school, I read one of the best-selling unpublished
books of all time, the 1958 tentative edition of Hart and Sacks' The Legal
Process.2 In the section on the legislature it suggested, as a clearly ludicrous
response to an unpopular court decision, that a bill be enacted stating that
3
the decision "is hereby disapproved."1
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Illinois Brick,
a close approximation of that bill was being circulated by a coalition of
state attorneys-general. The "sole purpose" of that bill, according to an
accompanying statement, was "to overrule Illinois Brick directly and nothing

else.

4

'

The Court's decision in Illinois Brick was viewed by some members of
5
Congress as a direct rebuff of the congressional efforts the previous year.
Typical of this sentiment was the statement of former Senator Hugh Scott,
the lead-off witness in the Senate hearings. He said the Court had "flouted
the will and purpose of Congress in a most crass fashion." ' 6 "[T]he Court,"
he said, "forgets that it was not present at the creation of the Antitrust
1431
2

U.S. 720 (1977).

H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958).

3

1d. at 800.
See Coalition Prepares Possible Legislation to Overrule Illinois Brick in Congress, 820 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-16, A-17 (June 30, 1977).
4

5

Senator Allen suggested that the speed of congressional response was the result of the 94th
Congress's pride of authorship.
6
Fair and Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, S. 1874: Hearings on S. 1874 before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977)
(statement of Hugh Scott) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
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I was present ....

'7
as a consumer remedy, not a middleman windfall."

We viewed the remedy

Note that Senator Scott mentioned two points. The first was that consumers might not have an adequate remedy. The second point, which was
given equal prominence, was his objection to a "windfall" for a "middleman." Is it any wonder that there was prompt congressional reaction to
a Supreme Court decision that came down four-square against the consumer
and for the middleman?
Today is the fourteen-month anniversary of the Illinois Brick decision, and
Congress still is attempting to pass a bill that eloquently says Illinois Brick
is overruled. 8 The delay has been long enough that the Supreme Court
had time to decide the Pfizer case, 9 and the overruling of that case has
been added to the two bills. 10 However, the delay may have been too long.
Althougfi both Committees finally have reported out Illinois Brick bills,"
neither bill has yet been scheduled for consideration.
I tried long and hard to determine whether I should be talking today
about the opinion or about legislation, and I regret that I have been unsuccessful. As you probably know, Senator Hatch has submitted at least 95
amendments to the bill, apparently in the newly popular effort to filibuster
by amendment. 1 2 From conversations with numerous Committee staff
members, I am convinced that Senator Hatch's opposition can be overcome
if the congressional leadership decides the bills are priority items. It also
seems probable that if the two Houses voted on the bills they would be
passed. The major question, of course, is whether votes on the bills will
be scheduled. Time is running out, and even the Committee staff members
are saying that this is too close to call.
Regardless of the outcome, it is interesting that these bills, which were
introduced with a great flurry of excitement quite a long time ago, have
not yet been passed and may well not be passed. This failure promptly
to pass relatively short bills reflects the fact that both the Illinois Brick case
and the Illinois Brick bills are more complex than they appear.
7

Id. at 15.

'Cf Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on H.R. 8359 before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977)
(testimony of John H. Shenefield) ("If it were possible for this committee to approve a piece
of legislation that said no more than, 'The rule in Illinois Brick is reversed,' that would be
ideal.") [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
'Pfizer v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
I'S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1978); H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1978).
"IS. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See S. REP.
No. 95-934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP.
No. 95-1397, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
' 2 Filibuster May Be Brewing Over Illinois Brick Measure, 873 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) at A-7 Uuly 20, 1978).
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In an attempt to make some sense out of the case and the bills, I will
first discuss the two relevant Supreme Court decisions. Then I will talk
about the complex problems that confronted Congress in its efforts to do
something about them, and a little about what they have done. Perhaps
the greatest complexity, which I will discuss last, is that nobody really knows
just what the effect of Illinois Brick will be. Finally, if time does not run
out, I will be bold enough to venture my own solution to the problem
of the "middleman windfall."

I.

HANOVER SHOE AND ILLINOIS BRICK

To understand the Illinois Brick decision, it is best to begin at the very
end. In a two-page dissent, Justice Blackmun suggested that the plaintiffs
were "the victims of an unhappy chronology. ' 13 He said he was confidentand I think he is right-that if the Illinois Brick case had been decided
before Hanover Shoe,1 4 the Court would have upheld the right of indirect
5
purchasers to recover.'
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, after all, could not be phrased more broadly:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
6
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" can recover treble damages.'
The Illinois Brick plaintiffs claimed they had been injured because the alleged
price fixing of concrete block had increased the cost of buildings they had
purchased. Invoking the time-worn canon of statutory construction that the
starting point is the language of the statute, 7 the plaintiffs demanded justice.
The problem, of course, was Hanover Shoe. In Hanover Shoe the Supreme
Court had held that persons overcharged directly normally will be deemed
to have been injured by the full amount of the overcharge. 18 In other words,
they get the whole pie. The dilemma confronting the Court ,in Illinois Brick
was that if the direct purchasers get the whole pie, how can there be any
pieces left over for indirect purchasers?
The Hanover Shoe decision had been based on two largely policy-oriented
considerations. 19 The first reason was deterrence. Justice White said that
if passing-on is a defense it is possible that only ultimate consumers will
13431 U.S. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
"5 Accord, House Hearings at 83 (testimony of Phillip Areeda).
1615 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).

I'E.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2370, 2375 (1978).
t8
See 392 U.S. at 489.
15

In addition to the policy considerations, the Court said that as a general matter the buyer
is injured the moment he pays an illegal overcharge, and subsequent events do not change
this. 392 U.S. at 489-90. This is a conclusion, however, and not a reason. See 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw § 337c, at 185 (1978).

Illinois Brick

LEGISLATIVE AFTERMATH

be allowed to recover damages. Because of the difficulty of doing this and
because each consumer's injury may be very small, they might not sue,
'20
and the wrongdoers then would retain "the fruits of their illegality."
The second reason was a concern that allowing lawyers to argue about
passing-on would greatly complicate litigation. Justice White explained that
it would be insuperably difficult for a defendant to show that a plaintiff
had raised his prices in response to higher costs or, if that could be shown,
21
that the plaintiff would not have raised his prices anyway.
Nine years after Hanover Shoe was decided, Justice White again considered
these factors, and applied them to the facts in Illinois Brick. Again the Court
held that a direct purchaser normally will be deemed to be injured by the
entire amount of the overcharge.
In the Illinois Brick opinion, however, the concern about deterrence is
deemphasized. Instead, the Court first said that allowing the offensive but
not the defensive use of passing-on would create unacceptably serious risks
of multiple liability. 22 Most important to the result, however, was the same
concern about the complications presented by passing-on issues that had
been evidenced in Justice White's opinion in Hanover Shoe. As in that case,
the Court expressed great concern about the complexity inherent in deciding
23
passing-on issues and the burden that this would place on the judiciary.
Because of the preeminence of this aspect, the Illinois Brick case probably
can best be understood as part of a more general concern of the Court
about the burdens on the judicial system and the problems presented by
24
complex litigation.
II. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Congress was confronted with a decision in which the Court almost explicitly recognized that it was reaching a result contrary to the interpretation
at 494.
d. at 492-93.

20)392 U.S.
21

22431

U.S. at 730. Although the Court said that vigorous private antitrust enforcement is

likely to be encouraged by adherence to a firm application of the Hanover Shoe rule, it is clear
from the opinion that this discussion was largely supplemental support for the Court's conclusion
and a rebuttal to contrary arguments.
23
Justice White stated that this was the "principal basis" for his opinion in Hanover Shoe.
Id. at 731-32. The Court in Illinois Brick said that allowing indirect purchasers to employ
passing-on theories to recover "would transform treble-damages actions into massive multiparty
litigations involving many levels of distribution and including large classes of ultimate consumers
remote from the defendant." Id. at 740.
24
See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 70, 229-30 (1977). This concern continues
to be evidenced in decisions by the Court. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 98 S. Ct. 2454
(1978); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 98 S. Ct. 2451 (1978); Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc. v. Sanders, 98 S. Ct. 2380 (1978).
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of Section 4 that Congress had assumed and approved of when it passed
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 25 less than a year

earlier. 26 Not too surprisingly, almost before the bills were drafted Illinois
Brick legislation appeared certain to be enacted.
Looking back on it, perhaps this was more of a curse than a blessing
for the proponents of the legislation. They were sprinting towards home
before anyone had decided where home was.
A. CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING LEGISLATION
The considerations that support the legislative reversal of Illinois Brick
are quite simple. I will spend relatively little time on them not because
they are not valid, but rather because they are self-evident.
Perhaps the strongest argument is illustrated by the reaction my laymen
friends would have when I would tell them about these remarks. I would
explain that under Illinois Brick they probably could not recover for overcharges caused by manufacturer price fixing. They would express disbelief.
It generally is conceded that direct purchasers commonly will pass on
some or possibly most of an improper overcharge. Of course, the amount
that can be expected to be passed on will depend upon the various elasticities. 27 But it has been observed that price fixing may be most likely to
take place where demand is relatively inelastic and, accordingly, where the
overcharge is likely to be passed on. 28 Indeed, Professor Posner, who spoke
yesterday, said in his statement before the House Subcommittee that under
"plausible assumptions" the level of the chain of distribution most likely
to incur injury is that of the ultimate consumer. 29 Since the person injured
normally should be the person compensated, there thus is a rather persuasive
argument for allowing the ultimate consumer to recover.
A second reason supporting reversal is that indirect purchasers arguably
can be effective enforcers of the antitrust laws, and some direct purchasers
may refrain from bringing suit out of fear of disrupting relations with suppli25
26

Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383-97 (Sept. 30, 1976).

This is clear in the dissenting opinions, of course. See 431 U.S. at 756-58 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); 431 U.S. at 766 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). More importantly, the majority opinion
rebuts this argument not by disputing it, but rather by narrowly pointing out that Congress
had not amended the applicable statutory language, and therefore the views of individual
legislators could not change the appropriate interpretation of the (preexisting) language. See
id. at 733-34 n.14.
27
See Watson, Bad Economics in the Antitrust Courtroom: Illinois Brick and the "Pass-On" Problem,
9 ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REV. No. 4, at 69, 79 (1977). See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
389-90 (10th ed. 1976) (incidence of a tax).
28Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 879-98 (1975).
29
House Hearings at 193 (statement of Richard A. Posner). Professor Posner said that injury
also would most likely be incurred by the suppliers of certain intermediate sellers. Id.
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ers. 3° The frequency with which this will occur was debated vigorously in
the hearings, but even Justice White recognized that it will happen on oc31
casion.
B.

PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONTED CONGRESS

Despite the legitimacy of these reasons, Congress found itself confronting
some problems. Their seriousness is illustrated by the fact that there was
opposition expressed in the hearings both by defense and by plaintiffs'
32
lawyers.
The problems can be divided into four categories. First, there was the
problem of possible duplicate recoveries. Second, there was concern about
deterrence. Third, it was unclear whether it really is possible to compensate
consumers for antitrust injuries (an issue that was mentioned but not dwelled
on in the Illinois Brick opinion). And fourth, there was the problem of the
complexity created by passing-on issues, and the corresponding burden on
the judiciary, that appeared to be preeminent in the opinion of the Court.
I will discuss these issues, and the responses by the Committees, in order.
1. Duplicate Recoveries
The possibility of duplicate recoveries was taken seriously by the two
Committees. Although there was vigorous debate as to the extent to which
this had been a problem as a practical matter prior to Illinois Brick,33 both
Committees decided it would be unfair to overrule Illinois Brick without
34
also overruling Hanover Shoe.
3

°See SENATE REPORT at 22-23; HOUSE REPORT at 6-9.

31431 U.S. at 746.
32

0n April 21, 1978, after several days of testimony by defense witnesses opposed to the
legislation, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard the testimony of Beverly C. Moore, director
of Citizens for Class Action Lawsuits, and of Perry Goldberg and James Sloan for an ad hoc
group of plaintiffs' lawyers. They raised serious questions about the proposed legislation, and,
on balance, opposed it. See 861 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-18 (April 27,
1978).
33
1t was recognized that because of the procedural mechanisms allowing consolidation of
trials, the length of antitrust cases, and the four year statute of limitations, conflicting litigated
results probably would not be common. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 761-64 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Illinois Brick v. Illinois, reprinted in
House Hearings at 411, 433-38; House Hearings at 113 (statement of Maxwell M. Blecher) ("The
prospect of double recoveries . . . is essentially a theoretical bugaboo."); House Hearings at 172
(statement ofJosef B. Cooper) ("I personally believe this theoretical prospect has been exaggerated and made into a judicial scapegoat."); cf. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731 n.l 1. The same
authorities also recognized, however, that duplicative litigated recoveries were possible. And,
although this point was not emphasized, it also was possible (as in fact happened in Illinois
Brick) that a defendant could settle a lawsuit with one level of purchasers only to risk liability
for the complete overcharge to another level. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731 n.l 1.
:"The SENATE REPORT rejected the suggestion by a number of plaintiffs' lawyers that only
Illinois Brick should be reversed. SENATE REPORT at 6. The HOUSE REPORT quoted (with emphasis
added) Professor Phillip Areeda: " 'On the issue of duplicative recoveries, it's very clear to
me that if one overruled Illinois Brick one has to overrule Hanover Shoe at the same time. That
seems to be the clearest point.' " HOUSE REPORT at 28.
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The Senate and the House Reports each expressly approved the defensive
use of passing-on in certain instances. Let me hasten to add, however, that
both the Senate and the House bills would allow a defendant to invoke
the passing-on defense only at the risk of proving some other plaintiff's
case. Thus, the Senate bill provides that the fact that a person has not
dealt directly with a defendant shall not bar recovery, and it allows passing-on as a defense-but only if it can be shown that the plaintiff passed
35
on the overcharge to "others, who are themselves entitled to recover."
The Committee Report explains that a defendant could invoke this defense only by showing that the overcharge was passed on to persons who
are not barred by "considerations of standing, the applicable statute of
36
limitations, or other limitations."
This is a remarkable provision indeed. If an overcharge is passed on
through several potential plaintiffs, would the defendant have to prove the
allocation of the injury? Would the defendant have to name the potential
plaintiff who is entitled to the recovery? For that matter, would he have
to guarantee the competence of the other plaintiffs' lawyers?
The reference to the statute of limitations is especially confusing. Since
the potential plaintiffs presumably will not have filed a complaint at the
same time the direct purchaser had, at least part of their damage claim
regularly will be barred by the statute of limitations. In these situations,
could the defendant prove passing-on only for the recent overcharges?
The House bill would create a similar but less extreme dilemma for defendants. It provides that an indirect purchaser may recover upon proof of
payment of an overcharge so long as he had been "in the chain of manufacture, production, or distribution." 37 Conversely, it would be a defense to
a damage claim to prove that the overcharge had been passed on to another
38
purchaser "in such chain."

35S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1978).
36

3

SENATE REPORT

at 25.

H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1978).

a"Id. The bill also provides that a damage award in a final judgment against a defendant
is admissible in a subsequent action as "conclusive evidence against such defendant" regarding
the amount of pass-on, and it is admissible as "primafacie evidence" regarding pass-on against
a plaintiffsuing that defendant. Id.
In addition, the bill addresses the so-called multiplier problem. According to some witnesses,
if a price fixer illegally raised his price one dollar, and this was passed on through several
levels of distribution each of which marked it up by a standard 10 percent, the defendant
potentially could be responsible for three times the original one dollar overcharge and each
10 percent increase on that overcharge. See Senate Hearings April 17, 1978 (statement of Betty
Bock at 12-18); Senate Hearings April 17, 1978 (statement of Peter D. Standish at 6-7); cf
House Hearings at 137 (remarks of Maxwell M. Blecher) ("I know of no case which addresses
that issue, but I would see no reason why he would be precluded from asserting that he

974
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Both bills attempt to create a closed system in which every penny of
injury would be recoverable by somebody. In the process, however, both
bills would raise confusing new issues. The House bill introduces the concept
of the "chain." I am told that it is a sister of standing, but not quite the
same. 39 And although the Senate bill reserves questions of standing to the
courts "except as made necessary" by the bill, 40 it probably would take
years before we knew to what extent the blessing of indirect plaintiffs would
change these rules.
2. Deterrence
The second problem confronting Congress was the question of deterrence.
Perhaps better than any other collection of people, this group knows that
direct purchasers bring lawsuits. 4 1 The lure of treble damages can make
42
a plaintiff out of the most conservative businessman.

Any attempt to overrule Hanover Shoe even in part runs the risk of reducing
private antitrust enforcement by lessening the incentive for direct purchasers
to sue. This'is inevitable even if Congress succeeds in creating a closed system
in which the entire overcharge can be recovered either by one or by several
plaintiffs. The reason, of course, is that lawsuits may become more complicated and expensive, and the potential rewards for each plaintiff usually
would be reduced because the recovery may have to be shared. 43 Needless

had paid more by X amount, including the markup of a prior seller, than he would have
in the absence of a conspiracy.").
Although I understand that a middleman might choose to raise his price at the same time
his costs increase, I am not persuaded that as a legal matter a defendant would be responsible
for compensating a plaintiff because a middleman chose to increase his return. See House Hearings

at 81 (remarks of Phillip Areeda). In any event, Congressman McClory was sufficiently worried
about, the problem to introduce an amendment, which the Committee adopted, that added
a proviso limiting an indirect purchaser's recovery to the initial overcharge. H.R. 11942, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1978). See House Panel Defers Decision on Illinois Brick Reversal Bill, 868
ANTITRUST & TRAoE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-6, A-7 (June 15, 1978).
39
The phrase is discussed principally by use of examples in HOUSE REPORT at 14-20. Compare
HousE REPORT at 60-63 (minority views).
40
S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (6) (1978).
41See, e.g., Senate Hearings April 7, 1978 (statement of Milton Handler and Michael D. Blechman); Senate Hearings April 24, 1978 (statement of Francis R. Kirkham); Senate Hearings at
131 (statement of Earl E. Pollock) ("IT]he overwhelming bulk of private antitrust enforcement
... has been through actions brought by direct purchasers.").
42
Athough there is concern that some direct purchasers may, fail to sue out of fear of
jeopardizing a relationship with a supplier, (see Senate Hearings at 10 n.2, n.3) on occasion
dealers have been known to file lawsuits in order to prevent termination. Also, it has been
noted that there can be an effective lawsuit when only one or two disgruntled dealers are
willing to file on behalf of a larger class. See House Hearings at 135 (remarks of David L. Foster).
43
See Senate Hearings April 24, 1978 (statement of Julian 0. von Kalinowski at 3); Senate
Hearings April 21, 1978 (remarks of Perry Goldberg), reprinted in SENATE REPORT pt. II, at 13
(minority views).
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to say, the potential rewards for lawyers representing direct purchasers also
44
would be lessened.
Both Committees recognized that much of private antitrust enforcement
has been by direct purchasers. 45 The principal response in the two Reports
46
was to note that numerous indirect purchasers also have filed antitrust suits.
The House Judiciary Committee further responded to the concern about
deterrence by providing that a court in its discretion may allow the fact
of injury and the amount of damage sustained or passed on to be proven
47
on a class-wide basis, and it may allow the class to seek average damages.
This provision raises issues that have been debated before, and I will not
go into them here. 48 Moreover, since this authority is only discretionary
49
it will not necessarily solve the problem.
3. Difficulty of Compensating Consumers
It also may not solve the third problem that confronted Congress, namely,
the likelihood that as a practical matter it often may not be possible to
compensate ultimate consumers. Because of manageability problems and the
expense of litigating class action lawsuits, it frequently is observed that much
of a recovery can be consumed by the cost of determining it, and, even
50
if it is not, many consumers will not claim their small share.
44
Enforcement actions by private plaintiffs also could be jeopardized because the additional
factual issues that would have to be explored with regard to each plaintiff's passing-on could
prevent certification of a class. See HOUSE REPORT at 65 (minority views); House Hearings at

120-21 (statement of David L. Foster); cf 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 332c,

at 157 n.18 (1978), wherein the authors state:
The need to establish individual damage claims is most likely to prevent the certification of a class action in those cases where there is a question whether some members
suffer any damage at all. The issue is presented most frequently in cases involving

indirect purchasers. The court may then hold that the dominant question is whether
damages were passed on to individual cnsumers and that such a question is not
conducive to class-wide determination.
Compare Russo & Dubin v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. q 62,146 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) (common questions'do not predominate because each indirectly injured class member
would have to prove an overcharge) with In re.1ndependent Gasoline Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1
Trade Cas. 62,085, at 74,729 (D. Md.) (class certified in part because under plaintiff's theory
proof of overcharge would be sufficient); Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp.,
75 F.R.D. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed, 574 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1978) (class of direct
purchasers certified).
II
45
Cf SENATE REPORT at 20 (about 25 percent of the total antitrust private damage action
since 1960 reportedly involved only indirect purchasers); HOUSE REPORT at 9.
4

1See SENATE REPORT at 19-23; HOUSE REPORT at 6-9.

47

H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1978). See HoUsE REPORT at 14.
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
'See HOUSE REPORT at 65 (mninority views).
4

5

See Illinois Brick, wherein the Court states:

[Wle question the extent to which such an attempt would make individual victims
whole for actual injuries suffered rather than simply depleting the overall recovery

Illinois Brick
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As I mentioned, the House bill contains some controversial provisions
that are designed to facilitate class actions. In addition, it is possible that
the courts would employ innovative procedures to allow indirect purchasers
to recover. It also is possible, however, that this problem and the other
problems that troubled the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick simply would
result in the dismissing of suits by indirect purchasers on grounds of standing
5
or impossibility of proof of damages. '

4. Complexity
The fundamental concern of the Supreme Court, the concern about complexity and the burden on the judicial system, remains largely unsolved.
The majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee in its Report recognized
that proof of passing-on "may well be difficult," but said that this difficulty
does not justify sacrificing important rights.

52

And although the House bill

contains some procedural changes, the House Report responds to the Court's
concern basically by stating that the complexity is not as great as one might
53
think.
5. Effective Date
One additional specific issue that troubled the Committees was what the
effective date of the legislation should be. The House bill would apply only
to actions that are pending on the date of the bill's enactment, or are
commenced that date or thereafter. 54 This raises some policy questions and
possibly some constitutional problems, but generally it is regarded by defense
lawyers as more acceptable than the Senate language. The Senate bill would

in litigation over pass-on issues. Many of the indirect purchasers barred from asserting
pass-on claims under the Hanover Shoe rule have such a small stake in lawsuit that
even if they were to recover as part of a class, only a small fraction would be likely
to come forward to collect their damages.
431 U.S. at 747 (footnote omitted); House Hearings at 114 (statement of Maxwell M. Blecher)
("The antitrust class action . . . has been a failure in terms of providing meaningful compensation to victims .... "). Class action problems may have been increased further by other Court
decisions. See cases cited at note 24 supra.
51

Cf House Hearings at 118 (statement of David L. Foster) ("The Supreme Court did not
deny standing to the Illinois Brick plaintiffs because they were indirect purchasers. The Court
rested not on indirectness but on the difficulties o" tracing damages and of avoiding duplicate
recoveries."); Senate Hearings at 140 (statement of Earl E. Pollock) ("[E]ven before Ilinois Brick
suits by indirect purchasers (e.g., Plumbing Fixtures) have frequently been unsuccessful either
because of limitations of the cause of action or the difficulties . . . of tracing impact through
successive distribution levels.").
52
SENATE REPORT at 6-7. In addition, the SENATE REPORT states that numerous court decisions
have awarded damages to indirect purchasers without being overwhelmed by complications,
and it quotes the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department's Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, who said that procedural and judicial management
problems can be solved either by the courts themselves or through legislation that is being
prepared. Id.
3

5 See HousE REPORT at 13. Compare HoUsE REPORT at 64 (minority views).
54
H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1978).
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apply to actions that were pending on the date of the Illinois Brick decision
or filed thereafter. 55 There are serious questions both
5 6 as to whether this
I
is proper and constitutional, and as to what it means.
The Senate Report recognizes that it might be unfair to apply the legislation to cases that have been finally disposed of prior to the 'date of enactment. 57 In a conversation yesterday with Tom Sussman of Senator
Kennedy's Subcommittee, I learned that despite the bill's language he does
not think it would apply to a case finally disposed of prior to the bill's
effective date, regardless whether the case was pending on' the date of the
Illinois Brick decision. Even if Tom's interpretation is not correct, as a practical matter it may mean that if there is legislation this part of it will be
modeled after the House bill.
III. EFFECT OF ILLINOIS BRICK
Perhaps the greatest problem that confronted Congress was that no one
really knows what the effect of Illinois Brick will be. There are two reasons
for this. First, it is 'too early to tell whether the various exceptions to the
Illinois Brick rule will provide significant relief. Second, we don't know to
what extent indirect purchasers can avoid Illinois Brick barriers by filing
claims based on something other than Section 4 of the Clayton Act.5 8

A.

ILLINOIS BRICK EXCEPTIONS

To be sure, there have been indirect purchasers that have, as sometimes
is said, been "Illinois Bricked." 5 9 Just one month after the Court issued
the Illinois Brick decision, for instance, the definition of the class certified
in the Folding Carton Litigation was amended to include only direct pur60
chasers.

'15S.
1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1978).
56
The Senate Judiciary Committee minority contends that it would be unfair and possibly
unconstitutional to apply the bills to conduct occurring before enactment. SENATE REPORT,
pt. I, at 75-78 (minority views).
57

SENATE REPORT at 28.

5815 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
59

See Beckers v. International Snowmobile Industry Ass'n, 1978-2 Trade Cas.

62,191 (8th

Cir.); In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,934 at 73,951
(3d Cir. 1978) (plaintiff appealed only with regard to direct purchases from defendants; in
light of Illinois Brick "plaintiff has no hope of success on the purchases from nondefendants.");
In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,059, at 74,587 (M.D. Pa.)
(because most purchasers were indirect and thus might be barred, class was not sufficiently
numerous); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 1 61,794 (N.D. Tex.);
Russo & Dubin v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
6wIn re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 727 (N.D. 11. 1977). However, the
efforts of the plaintiffs in the Folding Carton Litigation to avoid discovery of financial information
allegedly made irrelevant by the Illinois Brick decision were unsuccessful. In re Folding Carton
Antitrust Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. I11.
1977).
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On the other hand, defendants have not all been so successful. In the
Arizona Cement and Concrete Litigation, Judge Muecke denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment against indirect purchasers because, he said,
there were material facts in issue. 61 Judge Muecke listed a series of questions
that went to the scope of several exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule.
1. Cost-Plus Contracts
One exception mentioned by Judge Muecke was the exception for preexisting cost-plus contracts. 62 The Supreme Court in the Hanover Shoe opinion
had recognized that there may be situations in which it would be easy
to prove that a plaintiff had not been injured, and gave as an example
the situation where there was a "pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract. '63 Because
the Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick rules dovetail, indirect purchasers with
pre-existing cost-plus contracts should be allowed to show that they have
been injured.
The Illinois Brick Court attempted to make clear that the "cost-plus"
exception is a very limited one and is not satisfied merely by an industry
practice of cost-plus pricing. 64 Nonetheless, it has been suggested by at least
one commentator that courts should allow recoveries by indirect purchasers
where there is the "functional equivalent" of a pre-existing cost-plus contract, 65 and this language was used by Judge Muecke in one of his questions
of fact. 6 6 It also is possible that some creative plaintiff will claim that even
though he had neither a cost-plus contract nor its functional equivalent,
there is some other reason that it is easy to prove passing-on and therefore,
under the rationale of the Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick exception, he should
67
be entitled to prove that he had been injured.
1

6 In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas.
62d. at 74,640.

62,069 (D. Ariz.).

63392 U.S. at 494.
64See 431 U.S. at 735-36, 744. See also Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp.,
75 F.R.D. 34, 39 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("The escalation clauses allegedly contained in some
of the leases between the named plaintiffs and their tenants do not satisfy the standards
enunciated in HanoverShoe for a valid invocation of the 'passing on' defense.").
65

See Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasersin Antitrust Litigation,

63 CORNELL L. REv. 309, 330 (1978) [hereinafter cited Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall].
61978-1 Trade Cas. at 74,640.
67

See Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall, supra note 65, at 333 n.100; cf Mangano v. American

Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187, 1188 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[Ajbsent a showing
by the plaintiffs that their purchases were made 'pursuant to a pre-existing cost-plus contract
or analogous fixed markup type of arrangement,' " dismissal is appropriate); In re Master Key
Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 1 74,680, at 94,981 (D. Conn.) (quoting affidavit of
economist testifying that overcharges will be fully passed on when demand is very inelastic).

A number of instances in which it allegedly would be easy to prove pass-on are discussed
in Schaefer, supra note 28, at 915-25. But see Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 743-45, where the

Court specifically rejected the classifying of situations in which passing-on is likely to occur.
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2. Ownership or Control
A second exception to Illinois Brick that Judge Muecke referred to is the
now famous footnote 16 exception for situations where "the direct purchaser
is owned or controlled by its customer. '68 The language of that footnote
applies clearly only to situations in which the plaintiff indirect purchaser
owns or controls the direct purchaser. An example of such a relationship
is provided by the Toilet Seat litigation, where the direct purchaser had acted
69
more or less as the plaintiffs agent.
However, some commentators have argued that policy reasons and the
cases cited by the Court suggest that the exception also should include
instances in which the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by the alleged
price fixer.70 Judge Muecke phrased his question of fact this way, 71 and
the Third Circuit in the Sugar Antitrust Litigation held that sale to a subsidiary
72
will not insulate an alleged price-fixer.
The meaning of ownership is fairly clear. As you can well imagine,
however, the meaning of "control" should be a fertile subject for litigation.
For instance, one of the cases mentioned by the Supreme Court in footnote
16 involved control possibly through credit relations. 73 It also has been
suggested by a commentator that the exception might apply in the franchising area.

74

The exception may not even be limited to instances in which there is
"ownership or control." Although this phrase is employed as a shorthand
reference, footnote 16 actually says, "Another situation in which market
forces have been superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted
is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer." It
is possible that market forces also could be found to have been superseded
in the regulatory context or some other situation not involving ownership
or control.
68431 U.S. at 736 n.16.

691n re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. T 61,601 (E.D. Mich.).
70
See Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall, supra note 65 at 327 n.81; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term,
91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 230 (1977). The Court employed a "'" cite of Perkins v. Standard
Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969) and In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191,
197, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). Both cases involved control of the
direct purchaser by the alleged wrongdoer.
" 1978-1 Trade Cas. at 74,640.
72
1n re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. 61,934 (3d Cir.). The court
ruled that the purchaser of candy from a subsidiary of a company that allegedly had fixed
the price of sugar used in that candy was not barred by Illinois Brick.
73
1n re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
919(1974).
74

Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall, supra note 65, at 328 n.84.
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3. Co-Conspirators
Judge Muecke listed the question of whether the plaintiffs had purchased
75
from a company that had combined and conspired with a defendant.
Although this "co-conspirator exception" was not specifically mentioned in
the Illinois Brick opinion-, two other courts already have indicated that that
case should not bar recovery when the direct purchaser was part of the
conspiracy.

76

This question also arose in the Sugar litigation. In a petition for rehearing,
the Third Circuit was confronted with the claim that one of the defendants
had not used its own sugar in manufacturing the candy purchased by the
plaintiff. In denying the petition, the court said it had assumed that the
defendants' sugar had been used in the defendants' candy. It implied that
the plaintiff could not recover if the sugar had been purchased from a
company not involved in the lawsuit, but it reserved judgment on the sticky
question of whether the plaintiff could recover if the sugar had been pur77
chased from an alleged co-conspirator.
In any event, it can be expected that plaintiffs regularly will name inter78
vening links in chains of distribution as defendants or co-conspirators.
B. ILLINOIS BRICK ALTERNATIVES
We have been discussing a number of ways that plaintiffs may, so to
speak, try to go through holes in the Illinois Brick wall. There are also a
number of ways they might attempt to go around that wall.
One possible vehicle for avoiding Illinois Brick is the use of suits for injunctions under Clayton Act Section 16. 79 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has held that state attorneys general have standing to sue as parens
patriae for injunctive relief under Section 16.80 Since Section 16 has a less
exacting requirement of a showing of injury than Section 4 does, and since
many of the problems that troubled the Court in Illinois Brick are not present
in an action for an injunction,8 ' it has been suggested that one of the results
75

1n re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas.
(D. Ariz.).

62,069, at 74,639

76

See In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,059, at 74,590 (M.D.
Pa.); Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,048, at 74,526 (M.D. Fla.).
77

1n re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1978-2 Trade Cas.
78

62,139 (3d Cir.).

Cf Gas-A-Tron v. American Oil Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,789 (D. Ariz.).
7915 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). Section 16 was made significantly more attractive by the 1976
amendment that authorized a court to award attorneys' fees to plaintiffs that substantially
prevailed.
8

Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1977).
House Hearings at 82 (remarks of Phillip Areeda). See cases cited in L.
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 247, at 772 n.6 (1977).
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of the Illinois Brick decision may be that this "sleeping giant" will become
82
a major factor in the antitrust world.
State attorneys general already have sought to avoid Illinois Brick by use
of Section 16.83 They also have attempted to do so by filing complaints
under state antitrust laws.84'It can be expected (and in fact already it has
happened) that creative state attorneys general will combine these two
methods of avoiding Illinois Brick by filing injunction suits in federal court
and then invoking the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction in an attempt to
85
obtain restitution under state law.
A third possible method of avoiding Illinois Brick questions is for states
in their role as purchases to insist that suppliers assign their rights to recover
for overcharges. If this can be done, it could solve Illinois Brick problems
86
at least where there is a relatively short chain of distribution.
Finally, it is possible that state attorneys general may be able to avoid
Illinois Brick issues by use of the parens patriae authority.8 7 This would be
particularly ironic because the belief that Illinois Brick had "gutted" that
88
authority was one of the chief factors behind the drive toward legislation.
Of course, it is by no means clear that Illinois Brick does not apply to
parenspatriaeactions. There was testimony in the hearings from distinguished
lawyers that because parens patriae allows a state to sue only on behalf of
a consumer who otherwise has an independent cause of action, Illinois Brick
is directly applicable to parens patriae suits.8 9 Indeed, one district court ap82

Analysis, Illegal Overcharges and Inquiry-Equal Application of the Pass-On Rule, 822 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at B-I, B-6 (July 14, 1977).
8
3111inois v. Leviton Mfg. Co., No. 78 C 179 (N.D. Ill., filed May 9, 1978), reported in Eight
Electrical Wiring Device Firms Charged with Price Fixing in Illinois Class Action, 866 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at D-5 (June 1, 1978).
4
E.g., Illinois v. Leviton Mfg. Co., No. 78L 9412 (Il1. at D-5 (June 1, 1978). However,
state courts may find the problems that troubled the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick even
more persuasive at the state level and follow that Court's lead. See Scaling the Illinois Brick
Wall, supra note 65, at 324. Indeed, Judge Schwartz of the New York Supreme Court recently
did so. Russo & Dubin v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 1978-2, Trade Cas. 62,146 (N.Y. Sup

Ct.).

85

See Massachusetts v. Leviton Mfg. Co., No. 78-1138 (D. Mass., filed May 23, 1978), reported
in Seven Electrical Wiring Device Firms Cited in Massachusetts Price Fixing Suit, 868 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at D-4 (June 15, 1978).
0

" However, it has been suggested that it may be difficult to obtain assignments, despite
the theoretical possibility. See Recent Developments in Antitrust Standing, 852 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) at A-4, A-6 (Feb. 23, 1978).
8
715 U.S.C.A. § 15c-h (West Supp. 1978).
8

8Cf SENATE REPORT at 16-17; HOUSE REPORT at 10.

"')See House Hearings at 81 (remarks of Phillip Areeda); House Hearings at 139 (remarks of
Maxwell M. Blecher).
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parently has assumed that Illinois Brick questions are at issue in parens patriae
90
cases.
Nonetheless, such distinguished commentators as Judge Tyler in his testimony on the Illinois Brick bills, the Harvard Law Review in its case note,
and Irv Scher in an extensive law review article have argued to the contrary. 91 In the parens patriae legislation Congress made a deliberate response
to the kinds of problems that troubled the Court in Illinois Brick. If that
response is sufficient, Illinois Brick may not prevent recovery on behalf of
indirect purchasers.
The answers to these questions will take some time to develop. But it
is interesting to observe that the probable principal beneficiaries of Illinois
Brick legislation, namely, the states in their capacities as indirect purchasers
and as parens patriae representatives of consumers, 92 may be able to achieve
most of the benefit of such legislation if their right to sue as parens patriae
for indirect purchasers is upheld and if they can succeed in requiring suppliers to assign rights to sue.
C.

ANOTHER BARRIER TO CONSUMER SUITS

I've discussed a number of the uncertainties that, depending on how they
are resolved, may make Illinois Brick legislation at least partially unnecessary.
There is one other uncertainty deserving of mention that may make the
bills insufficient.
The Eighth Circuit recently held that "consumers are not injured in their
'business or property' for purposes of Section 4."93 This would bar suits
even by direct purchasing consumers, and thus probably would not be af94
fected by the proposed bills. There is authority going the other way. If
the view of the Eighth Circuit is upheld, however, and if Congress decides
it wants consumers to be able to sue in their own name, then even if the
9

°See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1

Trade Cas.

61,839, at 73,497 (C.D.Cal.).

91

See Senate Hearings April 17, 1978 (statement of Harold R. Tyler, Jr.); Scher, Emerging
Issues Under The Antitrust Improvements Act Of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 718-27 (1977);
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 230-31 (1977).

92See, e.g.,
House Hearings at 142 (remarks of Maxwell M. Blecher).
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,098, at 74,814 (8th Cir.) Accord, Beckers
v. International Snowmobile Indus. Ass'n, 1978-2 Trade Cas.
62,191, at 75,321 n.2 (8th
Cir.) (alternative holding); Weinberg v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
1 61,250, at 70,760 (N.D. Cal.). The court in Reiter suggested that a different result might
be reached in aparenspatriae lawsuit. See 1978-1 Trade Cas. at 74,821.
94See Lohse v. Dairy Comm'n, 1977-2 Trade Cas. T 61,805 (D. Nev.) (dictum); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,639
93

(C.D. Cal.) (dictum); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,434 (D.D.C.);
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRuST LAw 337b (1978); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 81, at

771 n.3.
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Illinois Brick bills are passed some speaker may be here next year discussing
another Congressional initiative.
IV. FUTURE LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
If the bills are not voted on this year, the staffs of the Committees expect
to try again. They concede, however, that it may be difficult to move the
bills forward next year when passions will have cooled and pending cases
95
may have been dismissed.
If these issues are considered again next year, I would urge that the
congressional focus not be so narrow. In their legislative efforts to date,
the Committees have vigorously debated who should be entitled to the
automatic treble damage bonanza. If there is a next time, I would hope
that they would debate whether there should be an automatic bonanza
at all. If a corporation's executives are all in jail, and the corporate treasury
has paid a million dollar fine for each count, I fail to see how society benefits
from awarding treble damages to a plaintiff that merely follows in the
96
government's footsteps.
It is not a sufficient response to say that a wrongdoer deserves whatever
he gets. Automatic trebling imposes costs on society. It tends to trivialize
antitrust by inducing every plaintiff to color claims in antitrust terms, it
encourages the filing of unfounded suits, and it chills the creative development of the antitrust laws. 9 7 Moreover, it does all this at a substantial price
in terms of judicial resources and legal talent.
This price may be worth paying to reward a plaintiff that has risked
a great deal in litigating. It does not seem justified in the usual price fixing
case that follows a government action. 98 Therefore, Congress should consider
adopting the recommendation of the 1955 Attorney General's Committee
99
on the Antitrust Laws and make doubling or trebling discretionary.
950ne senior staff member told me he expected that the next Congress would modify the

Illinois Brick result only with regard to parens patriae actions (if the case is found to be applicable
to them).
96Violation of the Sherman Act was made a felony and the maximum fine for each violation
by a corporation was increased from $50,000 to $1 million by the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
"7The limitations of treble damage actions are discussed in Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1974);
Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (1973).
9
Compare House Hearings at 114 (statement of Maxwell M. Blecher) ("Moreover, in light of
28 U.S.C. § 1407, Cong'ess should question whether there is a need for antitrust class actions
of any type in cases where there has been an earlier government complaint or indictment.")
In the Illinois Brick oral argument, Assistant Attorney General Baker observed that although
there is substantial independent private antitrust litigation, that is not the case with pricing
fixing actions. 807 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-7, A-12 (March 29, 1977).
"9U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY

THE ANTITRUST LAWS 378-79 (1955).
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It can be argued in rebuttal that the injury inflicted on purchasers is
only a portion of the total harm caused by a violation of the antitrust
100
If
laws, or that additional recovery is needed for deterrence purposes.
society generally is injured, however, it should be society that recovers. To
some extent this may occur with parens patriae actions, with government
fines, and with civil penalties under the Magnuson-Moss Act if the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) is successful in extending that remedy to unfair
methods of competition. 1 1 If that is not sufficient, however, the proper
.response is to enact legislation allowing society, through the government,
to recover for injuries caused by violations.502
If there is a next time, I would urge that Congress consider this approach.
The problem of the middleman windfall could be solved very simply, in
part, by doing away with it.
MR. MILLSTEIN: The interesting part of the Illinois Brick discussion to me
is that as much as the Bar, all parts of it, tried to explain to Congress
what the problems were, the courts are undoubtedly going to be left with
all the problems. The litigation will be interminable and expensive. There
is not any qpestion but the recoveries will be eaten up by attorneys' fees
and litigation costs. And again, I predict that next year, someone will come
and address the Bar Association and accuse the legal profession of overcomplicating the situation.

There is no way that I have been able to discover to make everybody
happy. I think the best thing the Section can do is to continue to point
out the problems and to point out that simply leaving them to the courts
to work out is creating the very type of litigation which people are complaining about-long, complex, and expensive.
The next subject on the agenda is an international law-antitrust problem,
the act of state doctrine. Our problem here is one that revolves around
the fact that the U.S. courts and the United States itself has now officially
discovered that there are a lot of countries around the world that do not
t'0 E.g., Schaefer, Passing-On Theory inAntitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 883, 911-13 & n. 108.

10115 U.S.C.

§ 45(m)

(1976). In an interview in which he stated his intention to explore

seeking civil penalties and consumer redress, an FTC official noted that this could solve much
of the Illinois Brick problem. 855 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-13, A-14 (March
16, 1978).

'0 2See House Hearings at 114 (statement of Maxwell M. Blecher) ("Congress should consider

ways of ensuring that violators do not get to keep profits generated by antitrust violations.
One possibility is the institution of civil penalties equal to the damage caused-a sort of parens
patriae for the federal government.). Compare Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer
Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 675-76
(1976) (U.S. attorney general should be able to sue on behalf of consumers).
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have antitrust laws and who run their businesses and their business-government relationships differently than we do. The United States
and its business enterprises are now in competition vigorously with those
businesses who headquarter in countries with those sets of laws. An apparent
head-on collision has now occurred-namely that where a U.S. company
or companies finds itself in competition with a foreign company or companies here and abroad, the relationship between the foreign company or
companies and its government may now become an issue in an antitrust
court in the United States. This is no longer an isolated situation.
No one is better equipped to deal with this emerging and fascinating
problem than Barry Hawk, Professor of Law at Fordham Law School, who
is an expert in the area of international trade and antitrust. He is the
chairman of our ABA Antitrust Section on International Trade, and he
is now in the process of completing a textbook on international antitrust.
The text is to be published towards the end of 1978, if we leave Barry
alone long enough to polish it up.
Barry Hawk.

